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When we talk of legal scholarship, we ordinarily mean law review articles, 
university press books, and similar publications.  But those are far from the only 
outlets for a scholar’s research and opinions.  Many legal scholars write briefs, 
comments on agency action, popular press books, opinion pieces, and other 
works that are aimed at a wider audience.1  Legal scholars also maintain blogs, 
post on Twitter, testify before legislatures and other policy bodies, and give 
statements to the press.  From time to time, law professors have questioned 
what professional norms ought to apply when scholars engage in these non-
scholarly activities. 
In this short symposium contribution, I offer some tentative thoughts on 
what professional norms ought to apply to law professors who engage in a now-
popular form of public discourse: Twitter.  Specifically, I suggest that law 
professors should assume that, each time they tweet about a legal issue, they 
are making an implicit claim to expertise about that issue.  I also suggest that 
when law professors participate on Twitter, they should do so in a fashion that 
models the sort of reasoned debate that we teach law students. 
 
* Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland “Buck” Ransdell, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, 
University of North Carolina School of Law.  I am indebted to Brian Frye, Erica Goldberg, Rachel 
Gurvich, David Herzig, Andy Hessick, John Inazu, Micahel Kagan, Anthony Kreis, Alex Kreit, Orin 
Kerr, Michael Morley, and Alexandra Roberts for their helpful comments on this Essay.  
1. Some have argued that these other, non-traditional outlets for legal research and opinion 
should also “count” towards their professional obligation to produce scholarship—a debate that I do 
not take up here.  Of course, in calling these works “non-scholarship,” I am tipping my hand that I 
personally do not think that they “count” as the scholarship that we have a professional obligation to 
produce.  
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One might legitimately question the value of discussing Twitter in a 
symposium devoted to legal scholarship.2  With its rigid character limits and 
focus on “hot takes,”3 Twitter is arguably the antithesis of scholarship.4  And 
yet there is little doubt that Twitter has an increasingly important role in public 
discourse and legal discourse in particular.  There have been a number of 
exchanges criticizing how some law professors use the Twitter platform.5  
Nevertheless, I think that there is value in law professors participating on 
Twitter, and thus it is worth discussing whether, as a profession, legal 
academics ought to endorse or criticize certain behavior on Twitter.6 
 
2. Indeed, one might legitimately question the value of law professor participation on Twitter.  
Many law professors do not participate on Twitter.  And those of us that do, often question the value 
of the medium and the wisdom of our decision to participate in it.  See sources cited infra note 69. 
3. A “take” is an opinion or a point of view.  A “hot take” is a quickly expressed view, ordinarily 
based on simplistic reasoning.  See Hot take, URBAN DICTIONARY, 
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=hot+take [https://perma.cc/VD6Y-JSEM] (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2017) (defining “hot take” as an “opinion based on simplistic moralizing rather than 
actual thought”). 
4. “Twitter . . . is heavily frequented by legal academics, but often does not foster or even allow 
for circumspect, reasoned, dispassionate analysis.”  Erica Goldberg, What Makes a (Legal) Academic?, 
IN A CROWDED THEATER (Dec. 17, 2017), https://inacrowdedtheater.com/2017/12/17/what-makes-a-
legal-academic/#more-2922 [https://perma.cc/3GYA-B42K]. 
5. See, e.g., Joseph Bernstein, Why Is A Top Harvard Law Professor Sharing Anti-Trump 
Conspiracy Theories?, BUZZFEED (May 11, 2017, 3:18 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/josephbernstein/larry-tribe-
why?utm_term=.grXZZbmD3x#.evg44DXKR7 [https://perma.cc/L6A7-KPL6] (criticizing Professor 
Laurence Tribe for his Twitter activity). 
6. Professor Erica Goldberg also recently called for a development of professional norms for law 
professors on Twitter: 
Twitter, a medium which I also use, is heavily frequented by legal academics, but 
often does not foster or even allow for circumspect, reasoned, dispassionate 
analysis.  Overly partisan tweets outside of an academic’s area or bickering, with 
other professors or the general public, are unbecoming facets of Twitter.  Tweets 
designed to simply cleverly express a view . . . already held by one’s followers, 
for the purpose of ossifying positions, seem at direct odds with the academic 
pursuit.  Professors are people too, but when our Twitter accounts are connected 
to our status as professor, lines are blurred, and academic credibility is lost.  (I’m 
honestly not sure what the solution to that problem is, and of course we shouldn’t 
be restricting professors’ use of Twitter, but perhaps promoting better norms.  I 
am guilty of “like-seeking” behavior.) 
Goldberg, supra note 4. 
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A. Scholarly Norms for Non-Scholarship 
The idea that non-scholarship ought to be subject to scholarly norms is not 
new.  There are several law review articles on the topic.7  In 1999, Neal Devins 
and Cass Sunstein had a debate about the law professor letter that was submitted 
to Congress opposing the impeachment of President Bill Clinton.8  Ward 
Farnsworth wrote an article a few years later that dealt more generally with the 
practice of law professors “sign[ing] their names to amicus briefs, letters, and 
petitions addressed to courts and other decision-makers considering questions 
of public interest . . . .”9  More recently, Richard Fallon and Amanda Frost took 
different views on the appropriateness of law professors signing amicus briefs 
that include language and arguments for which they cannot personally vouch.10 
This scholarship can be roughly divided into two camps: Those who think 
that ordinary norms of scholarship apply (at least in some form) to non-
scholarship, and those who think that different norms ought to apply.11  The 
“same norms” view emphasizes the reputational and institutional harm to the 
legal academy that non-scholarship can cause.  Implicit in this view is the idea 
that law professors ought to remain silent if their statements would fall 
significantly short of the scholarly ideal.12  The “different norms” view rests on 
the ideas that law professors have a role to play in the non-academic resolution 
 
7. There is also plenty of non-scholarly writing on the topic.  See, e.g., Michael I. Krauss, The 
Law Professors’ Scandalous Statement Against Jeff Sessions, FORBES: #THEVERDICT (Jan. 5, 2017, 
11:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelkrauss/2017/01/05/the-law-professors-scandalous-
statement-against-jeff-sessions/#7f3d9c495a72 [https://perma.cc/MGL4-3KYF]; Eric Segall, Writing 
About Law in an Avalanche: What is a Scholar to Do?, DORF ON LAW (Nov. 1, 2017), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/11/writing-about-law-in-avalanche-what-is.html?m=1 
[https://perma.cc/FL45-G8MK]; Ilya Somin, The Ethics of Law Professor Amicus Briefs, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 29, 2011, 9:06 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/10/29/the-ethics-of-law-professor-
amicus-briefs [https://perma.cc/AS4B-4F5C]. 
8. Neal Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future of Academic 
Freedom, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 171–73 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Professors and Politics, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 191, 192–98 (1999). 
9. Ward Farnsworth, Talking Out of School: Notes on the Transmission of Intellectual Capital 
From the Legal Academy to Public Tribunals, 81 B.U. L. REV. 13, 13–14 (2001). 
10. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholars’ Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor, 4 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 223, 227 (2012); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Scholars’ Briefs: A Response to Richard 
Fallon, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 135, 139 (2013). 
11. Compare Devins, supra note 8, at 189–90 (arguing that law professors should only 
participate in partisan politics when they have a substantial amount of knowledge akin to professional 
norms), with Sunstein, supra note 8, at 195–96 (suggesting a less stringent standard). 
12. See Devins, supra note 8, at 189–90. 
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of important issues13 and that law, as a field, is not distinct from politics.14  
These differences suggest that the authors of these articles may disagree not 
only about whether scholarship norms ought to apply to non-scholarship, but 
also about the precise nature of scholarship norms themselves. 
I find value in both camps.  On the one hand, each time that we identify 
ourselves as law professors when making a public statement about legal issues, 
we ought to be mindful that such statements obviously include a claim to 
authority.  That is to say, if a person identifies herself as a law professor, she is 
making a claim to be an expert—someone who deserves to be taken seriously, 
if not to receive deference—that is independent from the content of any 
particular statement that she makes.15  We should also be aware that our public 
statements about legal issues often reflect on the legal academy as a whole.16  
On the other hand, I think that there is real value in law professors engaging 
with the courts, the political branches, and the broader public.17  Although law 
and politics are distinct fields,18 legal knowledge and expertise can be quite 
useful to the resolution of some political questions.  And when we make 
statements to non-legal or non-academic audiences, I think it is acceptable (if 
not preferable) to omit at least some of the nuance and complexity that would 
 
13. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 200 (“[I]t is perfectly responsible, maybe even a civic duty, 
for law professors to participate in public affairs, at least some of the time, by showing how what they 
know bears on public issues.”). 
14. See Frost, supra note 10, at 144–47 (arguing that “the ‘best’ or ‘correct’ legal result 
sometimes cannot be separated entirely, or even significantly, from political or ideological 
preferences” and arguing that “ideology should play a significant role in resolving close legal 
questions”). 
15. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1936 (2008) (“Like 
parents and judges of higher courts, those who are in authority typically rely, or at least can rely, on 
their role or position to provide reasons for their subjects to follow their rules, commands, orders, or 
instructions.”). 
16. As Ward Farnsworth has explained, “[W]hen a legal academic takes a position in public and 
identifies himself as a ‘law professor,’ he is trading on the equivalent of a trademark in that title,” and 
if some academics use the title in situations where they do not actually possess expertise, then 
“consumers of academic opinions” will not be able to tell whether a given law professor is an expert 
or not, leading to “consumer confusion or dilution of the ‘law professor’ mark.”  Farnsworth, supra 
note 9, at 17–19. 
17. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 200–01. 
18. “Law is not politics.  When law and politics are seen as indistinguishable, then the legal 
arguments of law professors can be dismissed as nothing more than fig leaves for preferred political 
outcomes.  I’ve seen far too much of that recently, and I think law professors should do all that they 
can to resist that view.”  Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ideological Diversity and Party Affiliation, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (June 17, 2017, 4:11 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/06/ideological-diversity-and-party-affiliation.html 
[https://perma.cc/2T23-WLVL]. 
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appear in a work of legal scholarship.  In short, I think that the legal academy 
ought to adhere to professional norms  when engaging in non-scholarship, but 
those norms are less demanding than the norms governing scholarship. 
Before proceeding further, it is important to be clear about what I mean by 
“norms.”  I do not mean that law professors should somehow be forbidden from 
saying certain things on Twitter.  A norm is different than a prohibition.  A 
norm is a standard of behavior that is desired or expected.  A single person 
cannot set a norm for a group; the group would have to agree, at least implicitly, 
on the appropriate standard.  So what I am proposing here is that law professors, 
as a group, come to a consensus about how we, as a group, ought to behave on 
Twitter.   
B. Twitter and the Dissemination of Ideas 
There are a number of reasons that a law professor might want to post on 
Twitter.19  As compared to the other platforms available to law professors, 
Twitter has distinct advantages as a method of communication with other law 
professors and with the public more generally.  Twitter allows law professors 
to broaden the reach of their ideas, increase their professional profiles, and 
communicate more easily and more quickly than other media. 
A law professor who wants to communicate an idea to other law professors 
has several options.  She can publish that idea in a law review article or an 
academic press book.  This process takes a long time, not only because writing 
those manuscripts involves a lot of time and effort, but also because it takes a 
significant amount of time, after a manuscript is complete, for it to appear in 
print.  Consequently, a law professor who has an idea about a timely topic may 
find that her idea is obsolete (or no longer of public interest) by the time it is 
published.  It is also uncertain how many people will read a professor’s law 
review article or academic book.  Because law review articles are quite long, 
readership may be limited to those who are researching the same topic.20  To be 
sure, a law review article published in an elite law journal is likely to be more 
widely read.  But a professor has little control over where her manuscript is 
published. 
The professor can attempt to communicate her idea to other law professors 
by speaking at academic conferences or faculty workshops.  But many 
 
19. See generally Chris Walker, Is There Any Reason Not to Be on Twitter (Jr. Law Prawfs 
FAQ), PRAWFSBLAWG, (April 20, 2016, 9:03 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/04/is-there-any-reason-not-to-be-on-twitter.html 
[https://perma.cc/9SUK-DLWD]. 
20. Readership for academic press books may be even lower.  Not only are they longer, but they 
are not included in the Westlaw and LEXIS databases that most law professors use for their research. 
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conferences and workshops are by invitation only.  Whether one receives an 
invitation to such a conference may depend on the strength of one’s personal 
connections to the organizer or whether one is already considered a “big name” 
in the field—issues over which most law professors have limited control.  Not 
all conferences require invitations; some have open calls for papers.  But the 
panel attendance at those conferences can be quite low.  And even if a professor 
is lucky enough to have a large audience at a conference, conference attendance 
is expensive.  Thus, there are limits to the number of conferences that a 
professor is likely to attend in a given year. 
Technology has made the communication of ideas within the academy 
somewhat easier.  Law professors are able to post their manuscripts on the 
Social Science Research Network (SSRN) or other repositories.  This allows 
professors to disseminate their manuscripts almost as soon as they are finished 
writing, thus eliminating the time lag associated with publication.21  The title 
and abstract of those manuscripts are emailed to other professors through 
digests or e-journals every few weeks.  Thus, more people may learn that a 
professor has written on a particular topic.22 
Law professors can also communicate their ideas by blogging.  A blog post 
is usually short, and therefore takes less time to write than an article or a book.  
Law professors also have the ability to make a blog post immediately available.  
This short time lag between when the law professor has the idea and when she 
makes it publicly available makes blog posts a good medium for law professors 
to disseminate their time-sensitive ideas. 
Although blogging allows for quick communication, blogging is not 
necessarily a good medium for ensuring that an idea is widely disseminated.  
There is no guarantee that other professors will see, let alone read, a blog post.  
Blog posts are not searchable in the Westlaw and LEXIS databases that most 
law professors use for their research.  Nor can a law professor depend on SSRN 
or another platform to disseminate her blog posts to a wider audience.  She must 
either join an established law professor blog or start her own blog and try to get 
other law professors to visit her blog’s website.  The law professor has only 
 
21. Those postings may be complicated by copyright concerns.  See Howard Wasserman, SSRN 
Postings and Copyright, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 15, 2016, 1:16 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/07/ssrn-postings-and-copyright.html 
[https://perma.cc/MND5-JNYR] (reporting that SSRN was removing law professors’ papers from the 
site over copyright concerns).  
22. Whether those additional people take the time to read the full article is a separate question.   
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limited control over whether her blog post will get a lot of traffic, and it can be 
quite difficult to increase that traffic.23 
Unsurprisingly, it is easier for a law professor to disseminate her ideas 
within the legal academy if she enjoys a strong professional reputation.  A 
professor with a strong professional reputation is likely to get more citations to 
her scholarship and receive more conference invitations.24  She is more likely 
to be invited to join an established blog; and if she chooses to start her own 
blog, the site is likely to receive a significant amount of traffic.  But a professor 
who is looking to develop a strong professional reputation must do so largely 
by trying to disseminate her ideas.  This creates a Catch-22, especially for junior 
faculty or faculty outside of the most elite law schools: They want to 
disseminate their ideas widely in order to develop a good professional 
reputation, but not already having such a reputation hampers their ability to 
disseminate their ideas widely. 
A law professor who wants to communicate her ideas outside of the 
academy is even more limited by her existing professional reputation, and she 
has even fewer options both to communicate her ideas and to increase her 
reputation.  She can try to publish op-eds or popular press books.  But it is much 
more difficult to publish in those venues than it is to publish in law reviews or 
with academic presses: manuscripts are not blind-reviewed, and thus authors 
who already have strong reputations are more likely to be published.  The 
professor can speak with reporters and try to get quoted in a news article or to 
make an appearance on radio or television.  But media calls are usually initiated 
by the journalist, rather than by the expert.  Law professors who do not already 
have national profiles are less likely to receive those calls.  And even if a 
professor wanted to be proactive and reach out to journalists herself, professors 
often don’t know which reporters are writing stories that might be relevant to 
the idea the professor wants to communicate.   
Twitter makes the communication of ideas both inside and outside of the 
academy much easier.25  Twitter allows professors to offer their opinions 
quickly and in an easily digested format.  Because tweets have character limits, 
 
23. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Public Face of Scholarship, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1201, 1217–
18 (2006) (noting the difficulty of academic bloggers in reaching large audiences). 
24. Stanley Fish has argued in favor of a system that benefits academics with good reputations; 
after all, those academics produced the high-quality scholarship that gave rise to those reputations.  See 
Stanley Fish, Guest Column, No Bias, No Merit: The Case against Blind Submission, 103 MOD. 
LANGUAGE ASS’N 739, 739–40, 744–45 (1988).  But sometimes those reputations linger long after a 
professor has ceased to contribute high quality scholarship, and their repeated inclusion at conferences 
and symposia crowd out newer voices, keeping the next generation of professors from creating their 
own good reputations.   
25. My thinking on the benefits of Twitter was greatly informed by Chris Walker’s blog post 
encouraging law professors to use the platform.  See Walker, supra note 19. 
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they allow professors to express an opinion on a topic without expending the 
time required to write something longer, like an academic article or a blog post.  
And the character limits of tweets allow readers to read and understand an idea 
far more quickly than if they had to read a book, a law review article, or even a 
blog post.  This allows readers to expose themselves to a greater number of 
ideas in a shorter period of time. 
Twitter also allows professors to offer their opinions on their own initiative.  
A professor who wants to comment on a newsworthy topic need not wait for a 
reporter to call her.  Twitter allows law professors to reach a national audience 
at the click of a mouse.  What is more, an idea or an opinion offered on Twitter 
can come to the attention of a journalist writing on the topic.  While journalists 
are unlikely to read law review articles or even law professor blogs, they often 
search Twitter.  And so a tweet may lead to media opportunities, such as quotes 
in newspaper articles or appearances on television shows, which will increase 
an academic’s professional profile. 
Twitter also makes it easier for law professors to communicate with other 
law professors.  Many law professors are on Twitter,26 and it is easy to interact 
with other professors by commenting on their posts or jumping into 
“conversations” that other professors are already having.  Indeed, it appears that 
this behavior is expected, even between professors who have never met each 
other before.  Twitter thus enables professors to increase their professional 
network without having to travel to conferences.   
The Twitter platform not only allows professors to more easily disseminate 
their ideas, it also gives professors more information about how many people 
have seen their idea, as well as who agrees or disagrees with the idea.  
Ordinarily, law professors have to wait for years in order to assess whether their 
ideas have had an impact.  The methods for assessing that impact are crude and 
obviously imperfect.27  And many of us have, at least on occasion, worried 
 
26. I do not have a head count of the law professors on Twitter.  But Bridget Crawford’s periodic 
“Census of Law Professor Twitter Users” indicates that the number is increasing at a steady rate.  
Compare Bridget Crawford, Census of Law Professor Twitter Users Version 3.0, FACULTY LOUNGE 
(Jan.  23, 2015, 7:44 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/01/census-of-law-professor-twitter-
users-version-30.html [https://perma.cc/2KBK-4CKP] (identifying 553 law professors on Twitter), 
with Bridget Crawford, Census of Law Professor Twitter Users Version 2.0, FACULTY LOUNGE (July 
26, 2012, 5:55 PM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2012/07/census-of-law-professor-twitter-users-
version-20.html [https://perma.cc/J9W3-WGQN] (identifying 204 law professors on Twitter). 
27. These methods for assessing impact include citation count surveys and informal feedback 
from peers.  See Fish, supra note 24, at 739; see also Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews That 
Lawyers Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, at A15.  The former are both widely consumed and 
widely reviled.  I assume that the latter occurs infrequently given the expressions of shock and gratitude 
that I’ve received from other law professors when I tell them that I have read one of their articles. 
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about whether anyone is actually reading the law review articles that we write.28  
Twitter allows professors to track how often their tweets are shared 
(“retweeted”) by others, how many users express approval of their tweets 
(“likes”), and even how many people see their tweets (“impressions”).  And 
because Twitter allows other users to instantaneously comment on tweets, it 
also gives professors the ability to further defend or refine their ideas in real 
time. 
C. Twitter’s Virtues as Vices 
By now I have established that there are a number of reasons why a law 
professor would want to express ideas on Twitter.  But the very features of 
Twitter that make it a good vehicle for expressing ideas are also its most 
problematic features for academics. 
Take, for example, the ability of a professor to express an opinion easily on 
Twitter.  One of the defining features of academic scholarship is that it is the 
product of considerable time and effort.29  Tweeting, as compared to writing 
traditional scholarship, takes almost no time or effort.  This makes Twitter an 
attractive venue for expressing ideas.  Avoiding the time and effort associated 
with legal scholarship allows a professor to communicate more ideas, to 
communicate ideas more quickly, and to communicate those ideas in the 
context of a particular newsworthy event.  But eliminating the time and effort 
associated with legal scholarship has other, quite negative consequences. 
Twitter is not designed to highlight or encourage effort.  Unlike longer 
formats, such as law review articles and blog posts, an idea expressed in a tweet 
is unlikely to contain much in the way of reasoning.  Tweets are conclusory.  
To be sure, some professors may be offering ideas on Twitter that they have 
explained more fully elsewhere.  Professors often use the platform to alert other 
professors to their scholarship and blog posts.30  But the shortened format of 
Twitter encourages professors to present the most streamlined version of their 
ideas—to cut to the chase of their conclusion and to leave out the long and 
 
28. Cf. Liptak, supra note 27 (claiming that “43 percent of law review articles have never been 
cited in another article or in a judicial decision”). 
29. The Draft Principles of Scholarly Ethics defines “Legal Scholarship” as published works 
that, inter alia, “are the product of significant effort and professional expertise.”  This feature is 
reflected in the norm of “exhaustiveness” included in the Draft Principles of Scholarly Ethics.  Draft 
Principles of Scholarly Ethics, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 897 (2018). 
30. See Michael Risch, Why Tweet? (Plus Some New and Better Data), FACULTY LOUNGE (Feb. 
2, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/02/why-tweet-plus-some-new-and-better-
data.html [https://perma.cc/QL2L-R52S] (presenting data suggesting that many law professors use 
Twitter to promote their scholarship, conference appearances, and other professional activities). 
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messy analysis that supports it.  And so what is offered on Twitter may 
transform legal scholarship into something unrecognizable.31 
What is worse, the shortened format may also distort ideas.  Because of the 
shortened format, professors must make choices about what information to 
highlight, what information to omit, and what information to treat superficially.  
Space constraints may create incentives for professors to treat an idea 
superficially—particularly ideas with which they disagree.  Law professors 
may present oversimplified versions of others’ arguments and then respond to 
that simple version rather than a more complete, or more nuanced version of 
the other person’s argument.  This tendency to oversimplify may transform 
substantive disagreements between academics into little more than virtual 
shouting matches. 
Twitter’s shortened format also encourages professors to share ideas that 
are not fully formed or vetted.  Because it is so easy to communicate ideas on 
Twitter, professors will often present ideas on Twitter for the first time.  
Precisely because the barriers to communicating an idea are so low, those who 
use Twitter will often use the platform to make statements that they would never 
make in other contexts—statements well outside of their areas of expertise, or 
statements that they have spent no more time thinking about than the time it 
took to type them.  It is the process of reasoning that forms the core of most 
legal analysis.32  And it is reasoning (rather than just our conclusions) that 
separates academics from non-academics.33  Thus, if a professor tweets 
casually—without reflection or depth of knowledge—then she is using the 
platform in a way that does not help her communicate her ideas as an academic. 
The ability to tweet casually is especially attractive when it comes to 
newsworthy topics.  Twitter allows those who have expertise on a topic to 
disseminate their ideas when that topic is timely.  For example, it could allow 
an expert on federal court jurisdiction to express an opinion on the merits of a 
newly issued Supreme Court case about mootness.  But Twitter does not 
 
31. Professors sometimes tie together multiple tweets into “threads.”  But such “tweet storms” 
are still significantly shorter than a typical blog post. 
32. Law professors and judges sometimes refer to this concept as whether they are able to “write 
out” an idea.  See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr. & Benjamin Wittes, Of Clerks and Perks, ATLANTIC 
(July/Aug. 2006), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/of-clerks-and-
perks/304959/ [https://perma.cc/8BHQ-UTPX] (“John Paul Stevens, the only justice who habitually 
writes his own first drafts, once told the journalist Tony Mauro: ‘Part of the reason [I write my own 
drafts] is for self-discipline . . . I don’t really understand a case until I write it out.’” (alterations in 
original)).  If a law professor or judge is unable to write down the analysis that supports her idea, then 
the assumption is that the idea may not be correct. 
33. Cf. Devins, supra note 8, at 186 (stating that “it is the reasoning of academics—not the 
conclusions they reach—which justifies academic freedom”). 
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distinguish between those law professors with expertise on a topic and those 
without.  A Twitter user is given the same opportunity to express an opinion on 
a topic about which she has written a multi-volume treatise as is given to a user 
who has never thought about a topic before that very moment.  How widely 
those opinions end up being disseminated will depend on how many 
“followers” a professor has and on how many other users choose to “retweet” 
that opinion.  And, unfortunately, one rarely gains large numbers of followers 
or garners large numbers of retweets by offering sober, nuanced analysis.  Pithy 
generalizations and partisan fodder are more likely to generate interest and 
followers.34 
Leaving aside the problem of expertise, the ability to comment quickly on 
newsworthy topics creates problems for the formation of a law professor’s 
ideas.  In scholarship, professors ordinarily offer their ideas as general 
principles that have been adopted after considerable reflection.35  This helps to 
ensure both that the ideas remain relevant and that the professor is committed 
to the principle as a principle.  Because the process of writing and publishing 
scholarship takes so long, a professor will publish an idea only after 
considerable reflection.36  In contrast, a law professor’s tweets on noteworthy 
events do not require generally applicable principles.  Professors can offer an 
opinion on a particular event—such as an opinion on whether a particular 
government action is constitutional—without having to articulate or defend a 
generally applicable principle.  Because a professor is expressing an opinion 
only about this particular instance, the opinion may have been influenced by 
her intuitions or preferences about the outcome of that particular case.  That is 
to say, it might reflect a political or personal preference rather than a considered 
legal opinion.37 
 
34. For a trenchant analysis of the social dynamics at play on Twitter and how they influence 
journalists on the platform, see Damon Linker, Twitter is Destroying America, WEEK (June 2, 2017), 
https://theweek.com/articles/702389/twitter-destroying-america [https://perma.cc/79H4-42PU]. 
35. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—A Research Agenda 
with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 598 (1999) (“‘[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 
is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them,’ whether they are 
executive officials or judges.  And one task of legal scholarship is to help courts translate vague, general 
statutory or constitutional language into rules that set forth somewhat more ‘explicit standards.’”) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). 
36. See Draft Principles of Scholarly Ethics, supra note 29 (referring to the norm of 
“exhaustiveness”).   
37. To be clear, I think that legal academics often overvalue a commitment to principles; the 
entire premise of a common law system is that contextual decision making has significant value.  But, 
at the same time, there is a difference between saying that the appropriate resolution of an issue can 
(and should) depend on the context, and saying that there is no difference between one’s legal opinions 
and one’s political opinions. 
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Perhaps most importantly, if a professor is using Twitter in order to express 
an idea on a noteworthy topic, then she is using the platform in order to avoid 
the time lag that would ordinarily provide an opportunity for reflection.  Like 
most law professors, I have often changed my mind about legal opinions after 
reflection.  Not only does Twitter not reward such reflection, it may actually 
discourage it.  The news cycle on Twitter is incredibly short, and those who 
tweet about an issue first often receive the most attention.  Thus, Twitter 
encourages and rewards those professors who offer opinions quickly, rather 
than those who leave themselves time for reflection. 
The increased control that Twitter gives over one’s opportunities to increase 
professional reputation can also be problematic.  Although the traditional 
scholarship model does not give professors much control over their professional 
reputations,38 the little control a law professor does have is over the quality of 
her scholarship.39  For most people, high-quality scholarship requires 
significant reflection and great depth of knowledge.  Twitter rewards the 
opposite.  Professors build a large Twitter following by tweeting often and by 
tweeting on noteworthy topics.40  But tweeting often and quickly on noteworthy 
topics is likely to lead a person to tweet without reflection or without depth of 
knowledge.  In other words, Twitter allows professors more control over their 
professional reputation, but it does so by inverting the incentives of traditional 
scholarship.  A professor who published law review articles on current events 
and without reflection would be mocked; but a professor who tweets in such a 
manner will likely be rewarded by a large Twitter following. 
Professors who decide to tweet without reflection and to tweet on 
newsworthy events also appear sometimes to forget that the platform is public.41  
 
38. Efforts should be made to change that.  
39. I distinguish between the actual quality of a law professor’s scholarship and the external 
markers of quality—such as law review placement and citation counts.  Professors have significant 
control over the former and limited control over the latter. 
40. See Michael Risch, How Law Professors Use Twitter, FACULTY LOUNGE (Jan. 27, 2015, 
6:30 AM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/01/how-law-professors-use-twitter.html 
[https://perma.cc/R42J-F5CK] (showing that those law professors who have more followers tweet 
more; “The cause and effect is likely symbiotic, but it does reflect something I’ve read about for other 
social media, like blogging: knowing you have readers creates pressure to produce more content.”).  
To be sure, some professors’ large Twitter followings may be attributable to reputations that they have 
established outside of the platform, such as by running a popular blog or appearing on television. 
41. As Eric Posner notes: 
In the non-virtual world, successful people take care to keep up impressions, for 
example, they avoid making controversial statements to friends, colleagues, and 
strangers except when unavoidable, and even then do so in a carefully respectful 
way.  [But on] Twitter, the same people act as if their audience consisted of a few 
like-minded friends and forget that it actually consists of a diverse group of 
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For example, many professors are quite careful to conduct their classes in an 
even-handed and non-partisan manner.  But those same professors may express 
opinions on Twitter about purely political issues with no apparent connection 
to law, opinions can be (and often are) seen by their students.42  These tweets 
can send a clear signal to students about the political affiliations and views of 
their professors, undermining the professors’ classroom efforts to present an 
even-handed and non-partisan image in the classroom.   
That Twitter makes it easy for professors to track the impact of their tweets 
makes its skewed incentives all the more salient.  A pithy comment on a timely 
topic is more likely to be widely “retweeted” and “liked” than a sensible and 
nuanced tweet on a purely legal topic.43  When professors see this dynamic—
when they are rewarded for the pithy and the timely—it encourages professors 
to tweet more of the same.44  Indeed, Eric Posner has pointed out that Twitter 
appears to have changed its algorithms so that they make pithy and timely—
i.e., non-academic—tweets more likely to be read.45 
Even Twitter’s ability to facilitate communications between law professors 
has its downsides.  Twitter’s quick communication sometimes allows 
professors to refine their ideas more efficiently.  But the ability to communicate 
quickly sometimes leads professors to communicate rudely.  Time for reflection 
doesn’t just help professors refine their ideas, it also gives them time to cool off 
and couch their disagreement with peers in polite (or at least professional) 
terms.  I am sorry to say that I have witnessed more than one professor whom I 
otherwise admire behave very rudely on Twitter.  And because Twitter is a 
constantly available platform, it allows people to tweet when they are tired, 
angry, or otherwise not their best selves.  This probably makes unprofessional 
behavior far more likely. 
 
people who may not agree with them in every particular . . . .  Without realizing 
it, people who use Twitter damage the image of themselves that they cultivate in 
the non-virtual world. 
Eric Posner, Twenty Theses About Twitter, ERIC POSNER (July 3, 2017), http://ericposner.com/twenty-
theses-about-twitter/ [https://perma.cc/X4SR-U998]. 
42. Forgetting that students can see their tweets raises problems not only about tweets that 
express political preferences, but also about tweets that address other aspects of teaching.  There are 
tweets that complain about grading or about student behavior—and one wonders whether professors 
who tweet such sentiments do so with the idea that their students can see these tweets in mind. 
43. See Posner, supra note 41 (“[T]he most effective tweet is a clever formulation of a view that 
everyone already believes.  If one lacks cleverness, forcefulness provides a second best.”). 
44. See Posner, supra note 41 (“People send tweets with a single overriding purpose: to get the 
tweet “liked” or retweeted. . . .  When your tweet is liked or retweeted, you enjoy a dopamine surge.”). 
45. Eric Posner, The Worthy Tweet, ERIC POSNER (March 3, 2018), http://ericposner.com/the-
worthy-tweet/ [https://perma.cc/3LQS-ZGNF]. 
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I should note that I am personally guilty of many of the Twitter vices that I 
have identified.  I have tweeted outside of my area of expertise; I have allowed 
newsworthiness to eclipse rigorous analysis and reflection; and I have 
sometimes tweeted in an intemperate tone.  The fact that the Twitter platform 
facilitates, and at times incentivizes such behavior is not an excuse for what 
I’ve done.  But I do tend to think that, to the extent more law professors exhibit 
this behavior on Twitter, the behavior is likely to increase.  Indeed, the legal 
literature on norms suggests that our behavior is, in many respects, influenced 
by the behavior we see in our environments more than by legal prohibitions.46  
Thus, if more law professors were to eschew the vices of Twitter—if, as a 
profession, we were to develop informal social norms to counteract the 
incentives of the platform—then we could see a real positive change in how 
law professors behave on Twitter. 
D.  Suggested Norms for Law Professors on Twitter 
Twitter provides law professors with an easily accessible public platform.  
Participating on Twitter allows a law professor to share her ideas and increase 
her professional profile more easily than publishing traditional scholarship and 
attending conferences.  But a law professor’s participation on Twitter isn’t 
necessarily limited to shaping a law professors individual public image; the law 
professor’s participation can also shape public perception of law professors as 
a group.   
To be clear, not everything that a professor does necessarily reflects on the 
academy as a whole.  If a law professor tweets about a sporting event,47 
complains about the state of public transit in her city, or tweets about some 
other relatively mundane issue that has nothing to do with the law,48 then her 
tweets are unlikely to have an effect on the reputation of the legal academy as 
a whole.49  But when professors tweet about legal issues, or when they tweet 
false and incendiary information from Twitter accounts that identify them as 
law professors, then their behavior on the platform may reflect not only on them 
as individuals, but also on the legal academy as a whole.50 
 
46. See generally RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND 
LIMITS (2015); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000). 
47. I had no idea how many law professors were Philadelphia Eagles fans. 
48. Larry Ribstein called this sort of public writing by academics “recreational expression.”  
Ribstein, supra note 23, at 1202. 
49. But, as discussed below, the manner in which those tweets are framed may raise other 
problems. 
50. See Goldberg, supra note 4 (“Professors are people too, but when our Twitter accounts are 
connected to our status as professor, lines are blurred, and academic credibility is lost.”); see also supra 
notes 15–16 and accompanying text.  
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Because law professors’ tweets may affect public perception of law 
professors as a group, we, as a group, should work to develop norms associated 
with law professor participation on Twitter.  Indeed, we should work to develop 
norms associated with all types of non-scholarship public discourse, including 
op-eds,51 legislative testimony,52 and amicus briefs.53  But this short essay is 
focused on Twitter. 
 I have two suggested norms for law professors who tweet: First, law 
professors should assume that, each time they tweet about a legal issue, they 
are making an implicit claim to expertise about that issue.  Second, professors 
who participate on Twitter should keep in mind that they are part of a profession 
that is committed to promoting reasoned debate.  These norms will not correct 
all of the Twitter vices identified in this Essay—they are far too modest to do 
that.  But my hope is that, in proposing relatively modest norms, they are more 
likely to be accepted by other professors. 
 Importantly, these suggested norms are directed only at those who publicly 
identify themselves as law professors on Twitter.  A law professor whose 
Twitter profile and tweets do not identify her as a law professor is “tweeting in 
her personal capacity” and should feel free to tweet only with her own 
reputation and interests in mind.  And a law professor’s posts on other non-
publicly available social media, such as Facebook, are also more appropriately 
considered personal. 
 Perhaps more importantly, I am offering these norms as a starting point for 
discussion.  There are hundreds of law professors on Twitter, and each of them 
has their own approach and priorities.54  I know that at least some law professors 
disagree with the norms that I am suggesting.  Some law professors see Twitter 
primarily as a social platform, and thus they question why they should have to 
maintain a professional persona on it.55  Others insist that lawyers are 
 
51. See Paul Horwitz, The Small and Vast Difference Between Two Op-Eds, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(Aug. 25, 2017), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/08/the-small-and-vast-difference-
between-two-op-eds.html [https://perma.cc/JV7U-62UK] (raising questions about how law professors’ 
novel arguments ought to be presented in op-eds). 
52. Lee Fang, The Scholars Who Shill for Wall Street, NATION (Oct. 23, 2013), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/scholars-who-shill-wall-street/ [https://perma.cc/W2VP-F4VT] 
(raising concerns about a law professor who had testified about financial legislation without disclosing 
his outside funding). 
53. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 253; Frost, supra note 10, at 148 (discussing the conditions 
under which law professors ought to sign amicus briefs). 
54. See, e.g., Will Baude, Simple Principles for Tweeting Well, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 2, 
2018, 3:35 PM), http://reason.com/volokh/2018/03/02/simple-principles-for-tweeting-well 
[https://perma.cc/73FA-D483]; Josh Blackman, My Rules for Twitter, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Jan. 
15, 2018), http://joshblackman.com/blog/?s=rules+for+twitter. 
55. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge (@ProfBainbridge), TWITTER (Dec. 31, 2017, 10:44 PM), 
https://twitter.com/ProfBainbridge/status/947690062740721664 [https://perma.cc/F744-8VBJ] (“I 
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generalists, and thus law professors on Twitter should not feel constrained to 
their areas of expertise.56  But while I may be unable to convince all law 
professors that these norms are desirable, so long as a significant number of us 
agree on these norms, then they can go a long way towards ensuring that the 
virtues of Twitter for a legal academic are not overwhelmed by its vices. 
1. Assume you are claiming expertise when you tweet about issues related to 
law 
Law professors who identify themselves as law professors on their Twitter 
profiles are making a representation to the public.  They are identifying 
themselves as an expert on legal issues.  Thus, a person who identifies herself 
as a law professor on Twitter should assume that others will interpret that 
identification as a claim to expertise.  That claim to expertise lurks in the 
background of all tweets on legal topics. 
An implicit claim to expertise does not necessarily mean that a law 
professor should only tweet in areas where she is an expert.  Because Twitter is 
populated by many people who know very little about the law, a law professor 
will often be able to clarify or dispute a legal issue that is being 
mischaracterized by others, even if that issue is outside of her core area of 
expertise.  Law professors of all fields are experts in teaching others how to 
“think like a lawyer.”  And so law professors may have expertise in pointing 
out logical flaws in the reasoning of others, even when that reasoning isn’t 
necessarily about a legal issue.  But law professors should be careful when 
offering to clarify a legal misunderstanding outside of their field, or when 
disputing the logic in the non-legal claims of others.  Non-expert law professors 
need not remain silent; but they should make clear that they are not claiming 
expertise when they tweet about those matters.  Put differently, when tweeting 
on legal issues outside of their area of expertise, law professors should take care 
to dispel the implicit claim to expertise created by their self-identification as a 
law professor. 
Law professors can tweet in ways that dispel the implicit claim of expertise.  
They can, most obviously, disclaim expertise in a tweet itself.  Imagine, for 
 
guess I disagree with the premise.  For me, at least, Twitter is mainly recreational.  And political. And 
venting.  It’s not a venue where I go for reasoned discourse about the law. And it’s not a place to look 
for anyone speaking with authority.  It’s a saloon not a French salon.”). 
56. See, e.g., David Herzig (@professortax), TWITTER (Jan. 1, 2018, 11:28 AM), 
https://twitter.com/professortax/status/947882310539628545 [https://perma.cc/F75E-GJ8G] (“[N]ot 
sure why norm would be I can only comment on tax law.  I can file a lawsuit as a lawyer for any area 
of law as long as I’m willing to do leg work.  I can go to AALS and pontificate on anything.  Why is 
norm different here?”). 
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example, if a non-lawyer tweeted that, because a winning candidate for political 
office had accepted inappropriate campaign contributions, a new election 
should be held.  I would feel comfortable tweeting “I’m not an election law 
expert, but that’s not how the law deals with campaign finance violations.”   
Another way to dispel the implicit claim of expertise is to tweet in ways 
that do not appear to be premised on a claim of personal expertise.  Examples 
of tweets that are not premised on personal expertise include tweeting links to 
cases or to the scholarship or non-scholarly writings of those who are experts.  
For example, I am not an expert on Fourth Amendment searches.57  But if an 
event in the news implicated the constitutionality of a search, I would feel quite 
comfortable tweeting a link to a blog post by a law professor who is a Fourth 
Amendment expert and noting that the professor’s analysis seems sound. 
Law professors can also dispel the background presumption of expertise by 
framing their “takes” on newsworthy issues as questions, rather than as 
affirmative opinions.  If, for example, a public figure appears to have said 
something that seems to be an incorrect statement of First Amendment law, I 
should not tweet a statement that takes a definitive stance on the First 
Amendment because I am not an expert in the field.  But it would be entirely 
appropriate for me to tweet a quote of the statement and to ask how that 
statement can be squared with a particular Supreme Court case or a particular 
constitutional principle.  Such a tweet raises a legal issue, and it expresses 
skepticism; but it also signals that I do not have a definitive answer to the 
question that I have raised.58 
In response to an earlier version of this Essay, some law professors have 
argued that their implicit claim to expertise is limited to areas that they 
specifically identify in their Twitter bios.59  For example, my Twitter bio 
identifies me as a “[c]riminal law professor at the University of North 
Carolina.”  Thus, according to this argument, if I tweeted about the First 
Amendment or election law, there would be no background claim to expertise 
implicit in those tweets. 
I disagree.  For one thing, some law professors do not list areas of expertise 
in their bios; they just identify as law professors.  For another, people without 
 
57. I have taught Fourth Amendment issues many times, but I do not write on the topic. 
58. Framing non-expert thoughts as questions also has added benefits: It avoids embarrassment 
if a law professor is wrong about something, and it can make disagreement seem more polite. 
59. E.g., Michael Morley (@michaelmorley11), TWITTER (Mar. 20, 2018, 12:11 PM), 
https://twitter.com/michaelmorley11/status/976144214496088065 [https://perma.cc/UA6D-YBCJ] 
(noting “disagreement with [the] premise that, by tweeting as a law professor, I am presumptively 
implicitly claiming expertise in the subject matter of my tweets.  I have a general background in law, 
but claim some degree of expertise only in areas listed in my bio.”). 
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legal training may not be able to understand whether a particular area listed in 
a professor’s bio makes that person an “expert” on a particular topic.  For 
example, some law professors list “public law” as an area of expertise in their 
bios.60  Most non-lawyers do not know what “public law” means.  Other law 
professors list “constitutional law” or “constitutional theory” in their bios.  
Many non-lawyers that I know think that the Constitution (rather than statutes, 
regulations, or the common law) is the primary source of law in the United 
States.  And so they are likely to read such a bio as claiming expertise in 
absolutely everything having to do with law. 
To be clear, the implicit claim to expertise does not extend to everything 
that a law professor posts on Twitter.  A law professor has no implicit claim to 
expertise about sporting events, celebrity culture, or other obviously non-legal 
subjects just by virtue of the fact that they self-identify as a law professor on 
Twitter.61  The implicit claim to expertise arises only in tweets related to legal 
issues. 
One might question whether law professors’ tweets about political issues 
also carry an implicit claim to expertise.62  After all, it is often difficult to 
disentangle law from politics (and vice versa).  Take, for example, a law 
professor who tweeted that a particular presidential action should or should not 
lead to impeachment.  Whether impeachment is warranted is both a legal and a 
political question, and so it may be unclear whether the professor is making a 
legal statement—in which case the implicit claim is present—or a political 
statement—in which case it likely is not.  Reasonable minds could differ on this 
issue, but I believe that, to the extent that a law professor’s tweet on a political 
issue could be viewed as a tweet on a legal issue, then she should err on the side 
of caution and assume that there’s an implicit claim of expertise. 
 To be sure, assuming an implicit claim to expertise can be burdensome, and 
it may lead law professors to tweet less outside of their areas of expertise.  After 
all, a tweet that is framed as a question or that includes a disclaimer of expertise 
is hardly going to be thought pithy and retweeted widely.  And so some 
 
60. For example, Einer Elhauge identifies himself in his Twitter bio as “Harvard Law Professor, 
antitrust economist, and scholar focused on antitrust, contracts, health law policy, and public law.”  
Einer Elhauge (@elhauge), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/elhauge [https://perma.cc/7ARY-KRV2]. 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2018).  He is not the only law professor to use the “public law” moniker.  See 
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/search?f=users&vertical=default&q=public%20law&src=typd 
[https://perma.cc/5HWE-ZFB7] (last visited Mar. 28, 2018). 
61. Importantly, law professors are often experts in things other than law.  Many have advanced 
degrees in other fields, non-legal work experience, and similar backgrounds and experiences.  But 
identifying as a law professor does not implicate other potential areas of expertise. 
62. There is a related, but separate question, about whether law professors ought to refrain from 
making purely political statements while identifying as law professors.  That question is much bigger 
than this particular essay, and I do not take it up here. 
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professors may find it is simply not worth tweeting on newsworthy topics 
outside their area of expertise.  I’m not sure that is a bad thing. 
2. Help promote (or at least do not undermine) reasoned debate 
Whenever law professors express ideas, at least some people will disagree 
with them.  Disagreement is nothing new to law professors.  We often disagree 
with judges or other professors in our scholarship.  And when we publish our 
own scholarship or speak at conferences and workshops, people often disagree 
with us.  Engaging with those who disagree with us is part of our job as law 
professors. 
Using Twitter to engage with opposing views is not easy.  The character 
limits lead many Twitter users to be abrupt.  Those same limits also pose a 
challenge for offering explanations, rather than simply conclusions.  Some 
people appear to use Twitter primarily as a platform to inflame the passions of 
others,63 while others proudly proclaim that their tweets are meant to be 
“snarky.”64  Dealing with abrasive and downright rude people does not lead a 
person to be calm, cool, or collected. 
Even though the Twitter platform makes civil disagreement more difficult, 
law professors should strive to uphold the same norms of reasoned debate that 
we have in our disagreements about scholarship.  When disagreeing about ideas 
in scholarship, law professors are often able to do so in a professional manner.65  
They identify the precise grounds of debate, concede when appropriate, and 
keep the discussion focused on the substance of the arguments.  Twitter 
disagreements should follow the same form.  A law professor should ask 
herself, before tweeting, whether the tone and the content of her disagreement 
are appropriate given that she publicly identified herself as a law professor. 
One might wonder why a law professor ought to have a special obligation 
to promote reasoned debate.  What is it about law professors—as opposed to 
dentists, accountants, or elementary school teachers—that should require them 
to maintain a civil tone on Twitter?  The difference is that one of the major 
 
63. This phenomenon is so common that the internet has developed a slang term to refer to such 
people: troll.  A troll is a person who purposefully posts offensive comments in order to antagonize 
others.  See Internet Troll, URBAN DICTIONARY, 
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Internet%20Troll [https://perma.cc/K3VY-
GX9G] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
64. The term “snarky” appears to mean something roughly approximating sarcastic cynicism or 
rudely critical—and yet people (even law professors) seem to claim the characteristic as a badge of 
honor.  See Snarky, URBAN DICTIONARY, https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=snarky 
[https://perma.cc/PP6S-KZ7S] (last visited Jan. 27, 2018). 
65. I say “often” because not all law professors are equally gracious during substantive 
disputes.  Occasionally, a professor’s disagreement at a conference, workshop, or in published work 
can be unprofessional or rude. 
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skills we aim to teach our students in law school is to be able to argue 
dispassionately about controversial topics.  Our ability to disagree civilly with 
one another about our scholarship is not simple professionalism; it is part of 
what helps set legal thinkers apart from those without legal training. 
Indeed, in a recent article for Time Magazine, Yale Law School Dean 
Heather Gerken credited the training that law students receive as the reason we 
have not seen the same sort of efforts to limit free speech at law schools as we 
have seen elsewhere on University campuses:  
In law schools we don’t just teach our students to know the 
weaknesses in their own arguments.  We demand that they 
imaginatively and sympathetically reconstruct the best 
argument on the other side.  From the first day in class, students 
must defend an argument they don’t believe or pretend to be a 
judge whose values they dislike.  Every professor I know 
assigns cases that vindicate the side she favors—then brutally 
dismantles their reasoning.  Lawyers learn to see the world as 
their opponents do, and nothing is more humbling than that. 
We teach students that even the grandest principles have limits.  
The day you really become a lawyer is the day you realize that 
the law doesn’t—and shouldn’t—match everything you 
believe.  The litigation system is premised on the hope that 
truth will emerge if we ensure that everyone has a chance to 
have her say.66 
Given that law schools pride themselves on teaching their students “how to 
go to war without turning the other side into an enemy,”67 we should expect law 
professors to model that skill in their public discourse.  The ability to engage in 
reasoned debate is part of our shared identity as legal academics. 
That isn't to say that professors shouldn't be able to express opinions or 
strong feelings on Twitter.  But rather, that when they are on Twitter they 
shouldn’t advocate in favor of or against ideas in a fashion that is incompatible 
with reasoned debate.  They should speak in good faith, address others’ 
arguments on the merits, criticize arguments and actions rather than resorting 
to personal attacks, and generally try to avoid the over-the-top invective that 
often passes for public discourse in 2018.68 
 
66. Heather Gerken, Dean of Yale Law School: Campus Free Speech Is Not Up For Debate, 
TIME (July 13, 2017), http://time.com/4856225/law-school-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/7GHS-
HRHG].  
67. Id. 
68. Anthony M. Kries (@AnthonyMKreis), TWITTER (Mar. 20, 2018, 11:01 AM), 
https://twitter.com/AnthonyMKreis/status/976126686667378689 [https://perma.cc/BNK3-95D3] 
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 * * *  
 
Twitter can be a useful platform for law professors.  But it also poses a 
number of challenges.  Many law professors whom I admire avoid the platform 
all together; several others tweet, but express great ambivalence about doing 
so.69  The avoidance and ambivalence is attributable, at least in part, to the 
problems with the platform I’ve addressed here. 
But if the more circumspect and intellectually scrupulous law professors 
stay off Twitter, that is not necessarily good for the legal academy as a whole.  
Twitter may be a passing fad.  But right now it is a major platform by which 
the general public is exposed to law professors.  The law professors who are the 
most active on Twitter are, in a very real sense, the public face of the legal 
academy for a large segment of the country.  That is why the rest of the legal 
academy should take an interest in setting norms for the platform. 
 
 
(suggesting that law professors ought to “publish content that's civil/tasteful/good-natured befitting of 
the profession and is a good model for others, esp[ecially] students.”). 
69. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 4 (noting that Twitter often does not “allow for circumspect, 
reasoned, dispassionate analysis” and expressing concern that Twitter results in lost academic 
credibility); Horwitz, supra note 51 (“For my sins, I have become more active on Twitter lately.”); 
Derek T. Muller, The Rise and Fall of my Use of Twitter, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY (Jan. 15, 2018), 
http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2018/1/the-rise-and-fall-of-my-use-of-twitter 
[https://perma.cc/ZP36-DYSH] (“[O]ver time, I found that these benefits has lost much of their appeal, 
and the cost-benefit analysis has moved me away from using Twitter.”); Posner, supra note 41 
(characterizing Twitter as “a black hole of value-destroying technology for all concerned”). 
